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Phyllis van Slyck

Isabel Archer’s “Delicious Pain”:
Charting Lacanian Desire in
The Portrait of a Lady
That’s what love is. It’s one’s own ego that one loves in
love, one’s own ego made real on the imaginary level.
—Jacques Lacan, Freud’s Papers on Technique
I cannot escape my fate . . . I can’t escape unhappiness . . .
—Henry James, The Portrait of a Lady

I
In an early chapter of The Portrait of a Lady, Henry James’s
narrator, in an effort to illuminate the reader about Isabel Archer’s character, offers a gentle but somewhat ominous warning:
“Sometimes she went so far as to wish that she might find herself
some day in a difficult position, so that she should have the
pleasure of being as heroic as the occasion demanded” (James,
1995, p. 54).1 By the end of the novel it seems that James’s
heroine has been granted her wish: Isabel finds herself imprisoned in a “house of suffocation” where there is “neither light
nor air” (p. 360). Yet Isabel’s motive for returning to Gilbert
Osmond, despite her knowledge of his betrayal, begs for an
explanation that neither Isabel nor James offers us. Jonathan
Freedman has called the ending of The Portrait “an interpretive mystery . . . one of the most famous cruxes in American
literature” (1994, p. 78), and, more recently, J. Hillis Miller has
argued that “the basis of decision is hidden,” that we cannot
determine Isabel’s motive (2005, p. 16).2 James himself made
the following observation about the ending of The Portrait:
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The obvious criticism of course will be that it is not finished—that I have not seen the heroine to the end of
her situation—that I have left her en l’air.—This is both
true and false. The whole of anything is never told; you
can only take what groups together. What I have done has
that unity— it groups together. It is complete in itself—
and the rest may be taken up or not, later. (1947, p. 18)3

Despite the coherence James claims for his earliest masterpiece, with regard to Isabel’s final decision and “the end of
her situation,” he does leave us, as he puts it, en l’air, so perhaps
it is time to step back from the question of why Isabel returns
to Osmond in order to pose a broader one. What exactly does
James’s heroine want? Or, as Renata Salecl asks in her discussion of “Love Between Desire and Drive,” “What is the nature of
desire in a love relationship . . . what makes the loving subject
see the other as the object of love?” (1998, p. 46). Before we
can consider these pivotal questions that define the central
action of The Portrait of a Lady, let us review James’s reflections
on Isabel Archer in his 1908 preface to the New York Edition.
Observing that “millions of presumptuous girls, intelligent or
not intelligent, daily affront their destiny,” he asks “what is it
open to their destiny to be, at the most, that we should make
an ado about it?” (1995, p. 9). James argues that the writer
must find the most appropriate “difficulty” for his heroine and
the “most beautiful incentive,” and notes, tellingly, that this
difficulty or incentive must be found “in the young woman’s
own consciousness” (pp. 10–11). Unlike Catherine Sloper of
Washington Square, who presumes almost nothing, who lacks
the capacity to engage us with her intelligence, and whose
strength lies solely in her consistency and stubbornness—all
possible reasons for James’s dismissal of that text as unworthy
of inclusion in the New York Edition—Isabel Archer engages
us because she pursues her destiny with idealism and integrity,
and it is precisely her best qualities—her intelligence, her
generosity, her passion, and especially her innocent belief in
her right and capacity to compose an independent self—that
lead her to her fate.
James also observes in his preface that, for each of his
characters, he seeks “the complications they would be most
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likely to produce and to feel” (p. 5, emphasis added). How
might we understand the situation in which Isabel finds herself,
given the extent to which she helps to “produce” the kind of
“complications” that reverse and even destroy her most idealistic, and seemingly positive, intentions? I would like to offer
a reading of Isabel’s choices, a perverse reading, if you will,
but one which matches James’s heroine’s own perversion, her
consistent turning away from, even against, the very postulates
she claims to live by. Isabel’s discovery of love through the ideal
image of herself she finds mirrored in Gilbert Osmond’s gaze
leads to a reversal of her most noble impulses. Her choice of a
suitor also points to something that would seem the opposite of
desire, but which is, in fact, its foundation. In choosing Gilbert
Osmond, Isabel seeks to experience, however unconsciously,
what Jacques Lacan defines as jouissance, or “painful pleasure”
(1986/1992, p. 185).4 This is the pleasure that arises when the
individual goes beyond what is bearable, testing the limits of
desire, seeking an object, and a self, that can never be found.5
Although she insists on her ability to achieve psychological and
social freedom, to stand apart from what James refers to as her
“envelope of circumstances” (1995, p. 175), Isabel’s behavior
suggests that she is drawn, instead, to those situations that will
test the boundaries of that “self” and reveal its impossibility.
Isabel thus fulfills James’s effort to transform “the mere slim
shade of an intelligent but presumptuous girl, to [endow her]
with the high attributes of a Subject,” but not exactly in the
way James may have intended (pp. 8–9).
In her quest for completion, for that object which will perfectly reflect her ideal self, and in her choice of an “other” who
mirrors this ideal—but also, significantly, its dark interior, the
void at the center of identity—Isabel confronts her own alienated, ambiguous and in-coherent self, what Jacques Lacan calls
the split subject (1977, p. 128).6 Isabel’s choices throughout the
novel reveal her unconscious fascination with what lies beyond
the pleasure principle, and she tacitly embraces the death drive
as she confronts the irrevocable “lack” which constitutes the
human condition (Lacan, 1981, p. 214).7 Her final decision,
however, also offers her an ontological escape from Osmond’s
(and perhaps James’s own) formalist control of her identity.
Choosing to remain with someone who will render her desire
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impossible forces Isabel to experience the paradoxical “splitting” that exposes her shattered subjectivity. Her active role
in the destruction of her ideal of coherence and autonomy,
including her final decision to return to Osmond rather than
“to save what [she] can of her life” (p. 633), defines her, avant
la lettre, as a post-humanist subject.
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud argues that in the
end what we seek is not pleasure but the pain that connects
us with our unacknowledged but inevitable tendency towards
dissolution: “If we may assume as an experience admitting of no
exception that everything living dies from causes within itself,
and returns to the inorganic, we can only say ‘The goal of all
life is death’” (1920, p. 38). Shifting the interpretation of the
death drive from the biological to the ontological realm, Lacan
argues that the individual struggles not to return to a state of
equilibrium (as Freud suggests) but, rather, the opposite: to
maintain a state of permanent longing for an impossible object
of desire. In support of his position, Lacan claims that Freud,
too, recognizes the way desire is sustained by impossibility:
“Freud strongly indicates that what in the end gives the . . .
apparatus of the ego its real support, its consistency, is that it
is sustained within by this lost object.” Because love actually develops, and is supported, through this longing, Lacan explains,
“jouissance is introduced into the dimension of the subject’s
being” (2007, p. 50). Put simply, “the death drive is the name
given to that constant desire in the subject to break through
the pleasure principle towards the Thing; it is that which the
subject can never assume, integrate, subjectivize” (Evans, 1996,
p. 92). Lacan’s reworking of the Freudian death drive as a quest
for the lost object that can never be found offers insight into
the true nature of Isabel’s desire.
Early clues to the ambiguous nature of Isabel’s quest are
suggested once again by James’s narrator, who reminds the
reader just how contradictory her ideas about her emerging
identity are. She insists on her independence from social
constraints; she longs “to move in a realm of light, of natural wisdom” (p. 56), yet she cares deeply about what others
think of her. Her belief that “her life should always be in harmony with the most pleasing impression she should produce”
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(p. 54), anticipating William James’s “ideal social self
. . . a self that is at least worthy of approving recognition by the
highest possible judging companion” (James, 1890, p. 315), is
at odds with Isabel’s determination not to be bound by social
codes: “‘Nothing that belongs to me is any measure of me;
everything’s on the contrary a limit, a barrier, and a perfectly
arbitrary one’” (p. 175). James’s heroine’s insistence on her
autonomy—to her Aunt Lydia, to her cousin, Ralph, and to her
deceptive mentor, Serena Merle—and her desire to be free of
others’ control, is undermined, long before Gilbert Osmond
appears on the scene, by a conflict between her private ideal
of selfhood and her desire to be pleasing to the eye of an unnamed but definitive other. Despite her alleged program of
Emersonian self-realization, Isabel seeks acceptance by those
who reflect back to her an ideal self-image she has already
(though only vaguely) imagined.
For Lacan, the quest for an ideal self is precisely what sets
desire in motion, but the impossible desire we define as love
strikes us only when “the object coincides with [the] hero’s
fundamental [self] image” (1998, p. 142). The other must
mirror back to the subject a fulfilling portrait that she has
already, in a sense, composed: “The subject sees his being in a
reflection in relation to the other, that is to say in relation to
the ich-ideal” (1988, p. 125). Borrowing two terms from Freud,
the “ideal ego” and the “ego ideal,” Lacan explains that the
positioning of the self in relation to desire is directly related
to the formation of subjectivity. The ideal ego is an imaginary
projection that creates the illusion of unity, the illusion of a
self (precisely the illusion Isabel is at pains to defend): “The
human being only sees his form materialized, whole, the mirage
of himself, outside of himself” (1998, p. 140). The ego ideal,
in turn, is “the place in the symbolic order from which the
subject observes himself or herself in the way he or she would
like to be seen” (Salecl, 1998, p. 11).8
Henry James’s pervasive use of portraiture in this novel,
beginning with Isabel’s self-idealization and including her
portraits of her antagonists, may be related to the Lacanian
notion of the ego ideal, for James’s fascination with the distilling, dramatizing, but also dangerous function of such compos-
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ing reveals the way framing a subject traps the viewer. In this
context, James’s methodology anticipates Lacan’s ideas about
the function of the gaze and the mirror stage: the perceiver’s
composed object, of self or other, fills his or her consciousness
with an illusion, a misrecognition (Lacan, 1977, p. 6). The key
to the connection between Lacan’s description of the ego ideal
and Isabel’s quest is the alienation that the fantasy produces:
this imaginary space is “where the alienated relation of self
to its own image is created and maintained” (Klages, 2006, p.
80). What Isabel creates, or attempts to create, in her own selfidealization and her idealization of Osmond, is an illusion of a
self, as well as an illusion of mastery. Predictably, in the course
of her journey, Isabel discovers a profound gap between her
desire and its realization.
Despite her repeated professions of independence to her
aunt Touchett, her cousin Ralph, and to Madame Merle, Isabel’s thinking quickly reveals a paradox: the extent to which
the controlling fantasy of an ideal self or “ego ideal” dominates
her effort to follow her desire and secure a love object. In his
discussion of love, transference, and desire at the end of Four
Fundamental Concepts, Lacan tells a brief story that perfectly
captures James’s heroine’s stance in relation to love early in
the novel:
Not long ago a little girl said to me sweetly that it was
about time somebody began to look after her so that she
might seem lovable to herself. In saying this, she provided
the innocent admission of the mainspring that comes into
play in the first stage of the transference. The subject
has a relation with his analyst the centre of which is . . .
the privileged signifier known as the ego ideal, in so far
as from there he will feel himself both satisfactory and
loved. (1981, p. 257)
Like the “little girl” of Lacan’s story, Isabel is seeking someone who will make her feel “both satisfactory and loved.” While
her early suitors, Goodwood and Warburton, may seem to offer
this kind of love, it is Gilbert Osmond who provides the necessary transference. Isabel immediately recognizes in her suitor
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the narcissistic image that forms the substance of her ideal self.
Osmond seems to exhibit the exact qualities that define her
own aesthetic quest. He tells her that “one ought to make one’s
life a work of art” (p. 237), effectively mirroring, to Isabel, her
own early desire to be “one of the best . . . [to] be conscious of
a fine organization” (pp. 53–54). James’s heroine finds herself
deeply attracted to the controlled and refined aesthetic image
Osmond presents to her because she tacitly recognizes her own
ego ideal in his (calculated) self-representation. She responds
to Osmond, in other words, as the object that sets desire in
motion, what Lacan calls the objet petit a (1998, p. 77).9 As Salecl
explains, we love this object “because of the perfection that
we have striven to reach for our own ego” (1996, p. 187). Yet
what is important here is that Isabel’s concept of herself now
depends on “her misidentification with the image of another”
(Klages, 2006, p. 81).
Another important reason that Osmond performs this
function, when Isabel’s other suitors do not, is that Goodwood
and Warburton literally overwhelm Isabel with the presence of
their desire; Osmond offers, precisely, its absence. It is absence,
emptiness, lack, therefore, that defines the real nature of Isabel’s
desire: she seeks the object that can never be attained—something that will postpone, rather than grant, her satisfaction.
For Lacan, this deferral, or failure, is precisely what defines
the love relationship: “love . . . is in fact that which constitutes
a remainder in desire, namely, its cause, and sustains desire
through its lack of satisfaction (insatisfaction) and even its
impossibility” (1998, p. 6).10
Throughout the early chapters of the novel, Isabel repeatedly articulates a consistent interest in the kind of painful
pleasure described by Lacan: she seeks a kind of knowledge
that can be found only in situations that she herself defines as
unhappy. Of the space Isabel occupies in her Albany home,
the narrator comments, “she might have had the whole house
to choose from, and the room she had selected was the most
depressed of its scenes” (p. 33). When she tells her Aunt Lydia
of her feelings about her family home (“‘A great many people
have died here; the place has been full of life’”), Mrs. Touchett
responds with a Sophoclean irony that foreshadows Isabel’s fate:
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“‘You should go to Florence if you like houses in which things
have happened—especially deaths’” (pp. 35–36).
Yet Isabel ignores her aunt’s warning and persists in selecting “places where the vague lamplight expired,” insisting that
she must confront “the unpleasant” which has “been too absent
from her knowledge” (p. 39). She responds to Gardencourt’s
“well ordered privacy . . . where the tread was muffled by the
earth itself, and . . . all friction dropped out of contact and all
shrillness out of talk” in a way that anticipates the subtle control
that will soon attract her to Osmond (p. 57). It is not surprising, therefore, that Isabel’s initial appreciation of Osmond’s
Florentine villa, with its carefully manicured garden, is consistent with her earlier sympathy for other subdued environments
and her strong preference for a controlled aesthetic frame,
hinting at a fear of real intimacy, or perhaps a tacit awareness
of its impossibility.11
Osmond, predictably, is the first to understand Isabel’s
desire: he recognizes her quest for an ego ideal and mirrors
back to her exactly what she imagines for herself. Setting forth
an appreciative portrait over an intimate connection, he tells
Isabel, “For me you’ll always be the most important woman in
the world.” Isabel, in turn, sees herself reflected in his mind:
she “looked at herself in this character, looked intently, thinking
she filled it with a certain grace.” The satisfaction she experiences through Osmond’s mirroring of her ideal self—his words
“gratify her desire to think well of herself”—further clarifies her
attraction to someone who, in the narrator’s and reader’s eye,
is clearly her least appealing suitor (p. 264). Osmond grasps
the narcissistic nature of Isabel’s self-image and builds upon it,
while she in turn works, at least initially, to become the image
that Osmond has composed for her.
In this circular exchange, Osmond teaches Isabel about
the structure of desire—showing her that while on one level
it is our private fantasy, that fantasy is stimulated, brought into
being, through an intimate connection between something we
have already imagined for ourselves and something which is
recognized and offered to us by another. This connection, a
kind of symbolic exchange, “unleashes [a] fatal attachment,”
and according to Lacan, “that’s what love is. It’s one’s own ego
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that one loves in love, one’s own ego made real on the imaginary level” (1988, p. 142). We see the “unleashing” of Isabel’s
“fatal attachment” in her silent, appreciative composition of
her suitor, framed by his villa and the Florentine hills, when
she visits him for the first time. It is a gentle yet ominous image, one in which, as James’s narrator tellingly observes, her
“imagination supplied the human element which she was sure
had not been wanting”:
She had carried away an image from her visit to his hilltop
which her subsequent knowledge of him did nothing to
efface and which put on for her a particular harmony
with other supposed and divine things, histories within
histories: the image of a quiet, clever, sensitive, distinguished man, strolling on a moss-grown terrace above
the sweet Val d’Arno . . . The picture had no flourishes,
but she liked its lowness of tone and the atmosphere of
summer twilight that pervaded it. It spoke of the kind
of personal issue that touched her most nearly . . . of
a lonely studious life in a lovely land; of an old sorrow
that sometimes ached today; of a feeling of pride that
. . . had an element of nobleness . . . (p. 237)
This somber mood of a “lonely studious life” that already
contains “an old sorrow” clashes eerily with the vibrant energy
Isabel has brought to earlier conceptions of her identity. Her
attraction to this subdued, controlled atmosphere can only
be understood in relation to loss. This “picture” of Osmond
as “quiet, clever, sensitive,” someone whose “lowness of tone”
fills her with purpose, confirms the way Isabel will constitute
and sustain her desire, not through an expansive freedom but
through what she construes as a “noble” personal restraint.
Because she admires his “cultivated” “care for beauty and perfection,” she projects into his character “a feeling of pride” that
she believes she can share, for it has “an element of nobleness.”
But if Isabel imagines a future stretched before them “in the
disposed vistas . . . of a formal Italian garden,” the picture’s
“atmosphere of summer twilight” offers a hint that she has also
glimpsed the serpent (p. 237). Between the controlled boundary
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of the garden and the fading light, the shadow of repression,
not freedom, asserts itself. Even Osmond’s domicile, the Palazzo
Roccanera’s “incommunicative character,” with its “heavy lids,
but no eyes,” its face that offers a “mask,” ominously announces
the negative space awaiting James’s heroine (p. 195). It is significant that Isabel identifies these qualities before stepping
over the threshold and marrying Osmond.
The independent ideal Isabel claims for herself in the
novel’s opening is connected in an almost fatal way to what
would seem to be its opposite: the desire of another, and
through that other, desire’s inherent impossibility. Osmond’s
function as an impossible object of desire, Lacan’s objet petit a,
emerges through Isabel’s observation of his rigid, aesthetically
shaped environment, a metonymy for his own deeply controlling nature.12 Information warning Isabel against Osmond
forms the basis of her attraction, betraying her implicit quest
for jouissance.
In order to meet Osmond’s desire, to become loveable
to him, Isabel must sacrifice the surface ideal of independent
self-realization she presents to her aunt Touchett, to her cousin
Ralph, and even to Serena Merle, and she seems eager to make
this sacrifice. Almost immediately after meeting Osmond, Isabel
abandons her dream of an independent life, letting him know
just how unimportant her autonomy really is to her: “I’m rather
ashamed of my plans; I make a new one every day” (p. 227).
Instead, she begins to reshape her desire to match what she
perceives Osmond wants her to be. All too quickly, Isabel adopts
Pansy’s “sympathetic docility” (p. 237) and waits, “with a certain
unuttered contentedness, to have her movements directed”
(p. 223). Under the spell of Osmond’s claim that one should
make one’s life a work of art, Isabel anticipates, and begins to
practice, the suppression of movement and energy her suitor
will demand. As she sits in the Gallery of the Roman Capitol,
resting her eyes on the “beautiful blank faces” of the antique
marbles, “listening . . . to their eternal silence,” she aligns
her subjectivity with their “deep stillness” (pp. 257–258). The
Greek sculptures offer a peaceful living death that matches an
unacknowledged desire for cessation: “their noble quietude . .
. as with a high door closed for the ceremony, slowly drops on
the spirit the large white mantle of peace” (p. 257).
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As Isabel studies her suitor, it becomes increasingly evident
that his psychological unavailability—the way he will invoke
loss—is the real basis of his appeal. She notes, for example,
that Osmond generates an anxiety, and even a paralysis, in her:
“His utterance was the vibration of glass, and if she had put
out her finger she might have changed the pitch and spoiled
the concert” (p. 213). Examining his “overdrawn, retouched”
features, Isabel sees that he is “fastidious,” “critical,” “probably
irritable” (p. 224). What attracts her is not his largeness of vision, his freedom or spontaneity, but rather his many signs of
“strong conviction” (p. 237). Consider, for example, Isabel’s
assessment of the way Osmond’s views are unlikely to change:
“He uttered his ideas as if . . . he were used to them and had
lived with them; old polished knobs and heads and handles
. . . that could be fitted if necessary to new walking sticks . . .”
(p. 238). Her own ideas are certainly about to be re-fitted to
those of Osmond, and it is important to note that her suitor’s
coldness and control do not emerge for Isabel. These qualities
are present in her earliest assessments. Osmond’s character
conforms not only to an aesthetic she naively cherishes but
also to a more complicated ontological need to confront the
limit of her desire, to experience jouissance.13
A nostalgia for what is already lost, disguised as aesthetic
idealism, informs Isabel’s responses as she continues to compose
herself so as to match her suitor’s vision of life as a work of art.
Just before Osmond proposes, Isabel contemplates the fact that
she is leaving Rome, and the thought makes her feel “a pang”
that “touched the source of tears” (p. 262). In the original 1881
edition of The Portrait, James’s narrator is more explicit: Isabel’s
heart throbs with a kind of “delicious pain” (James, 1997, p.
334). When Osmond confesses he is in love with her, Isabel
again feels a pang, but one that “suggest[s] . . . the slipping of
a fine bolt—backward, forward, she couldn’t have said which.”
Though he stands there “beautiful and generous” in her eyes,
he is invested “with the golden air of early autumn” (p. 263).
Isabel has already identified the consistent darkening of the
atmosphere that Osmond engenders and the prison-like space
she is about to enter: “there was a last vague space it couldn’t
cross—a dusky, uncertain tract which looked ambiguous and
even slightly treacherous, like a moorland seen in the winter
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twilight. But she was to cross it yet” (p. 265). “Summer twilight”
has become “winter twilight” even before the marriage takes
place, and Isabel acknowledges that she is moving into a world
whose dimensions are “uncertain,” even “treacherous.” But she
continues to embrace the absence that is Osmond because, as
Lacan would say, “what she has already affirmed herself to be
takes on an outward form” (1986/1992, p. 280).
Her suitor perfectly embodies the ontological emptiness
at the heart of her desire. Osmond’s aesthetic, material, and
sensual values are strangely conflated (“The finest—in the sense
of being the subtlest—manly organism she had ever known
had become her property . . .” [p. 358]), but possession, for
Isabel, is not an act that enables intimacy but, rather, one that
enforces aesthetic distance. As William Veeder has suggested,
“Osmond is for Isabel the quintessence of absence, the essential
nullity” (1990, p. 111). The absence that occupies the center
of desire and the way the object of desire is connected to the
Freudian death drive is insightfully described by Slavoj Žižek:
“The object is attainable only by way of an incessant postponement . . . It is here that sublimation sets in—the sublimation
in the Lacanian sense of the elevation of an object into the
dignity of the Thing” (1994, p. 96). Osmond has been elevated
to the “dignity of the Thing”; that is, he becomes “the black
hole around which desire is organized” (p. 96).14 Isabel’s choice
is an inevitable step in her movement towards the death drive.
It is a choice that will lead her to a confrontation with her
permanently incomplete and divided self.
II
A number of philosophical readings of The Portrait in the
last two decades suggest that, for James, an essentialist notion
of the self, of its coherence, was both problematic and fascinating. Such readings lay the foundation for my argument here
that James is implicitly critiquing the traditional humanist
notion of a coherent self and anticipating, in his portrait of
Isabel, a post-structuralist definition of the shattered subject.
Dana Ringuette argues that James’s “subject is dispersed within
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a matrix of relations without the comforting backdrop of a
conventional autonomous Cartesian ‘self’” (1990, p. 120), and
Priscilla Walton suggests that James’s characters demonstrate
what Althusser calls the “ambiguity of the subject” (1992, p.
96). Julie Rivkin traces James’s characters’ “discovery that behind representation there is no firm ground, no singular, easily
communicable and knowable presence of truth” (1996, p. 80),
and John Carlos Rowe observes that “the fractured, alienated
self may well be James’s topic in most of his novels and tales”
(1998, p. 14).
Readings that contest the coherence of the subject in James
are supported, from another angle, by psychoanalytic critics who
confirm the way Isabel’s quest for self-realization is consistently
undermined by her deliberate submission to Osmond’s will
and thus to self-negation. For Alfred Habegger, Isabel submits
to a “dominating master” believing that, in this way, she can
replace a “lost father” (1990, p. 53). Beth Sharon Ash argues
that “Isabel’s desire to establish a potentially autonomous
ego becomes an urgent, though unknowing, response to the
absent mother” and that Osmond is the “maternal husband”
who “becomes the bad mother all over again” (1990, p. 144).
But such readings rely upon evidence that lies outside James’s
text, and neither these nor the philosophical studies of James’s
characters’ subjectivity referenced above examine the connection to desire and to jouissance undertaken here.
Ann-Marie Priest takes the self-annihilation theme implicit
in a discussion of the death drive in a direction somewhat relevant to this reading, claiming that several of James’s heroines,
including Isabel, enact a “secularized version of the medieval
mystical narrative of abjection and transformation.” She argues
that through the “breaking and bruising” of the self, James’s
characters experience something akin to the mystic’s “exquisite agony of self-emptying” (2001, pp. 164, 177). But Isabel
confronts something beyond, and quite contrary to, a fulfilling abjection—and mystical transformation of her character
is not evident. Instead, anticipating the insight of protagonists
in James’s late works such as John Marcher of The Beast in the
Jungle and Maggie Verver of The Golden Bowl, Isabel experiences the moment when the object of desire reveals itself as
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emptiness, as lack. This moment, in James, as in classical literature, is reserved for the very brave, for the individual who
is willing to confront the limit, the impossibility, of her desire.
To understand the real nature of the self—something Isabel
can encounter only by entering what Lacan calls “the space
between two deaths”—she must, in a sense, die (1986/1992,
p. 248). The narcissistic fantasy and its persistent failure are
both essential components of desire. With willful consistency,
Isabel pursues her fate, seeking that moment in experience that
will reveal “the presence of death” (Lacan, 1981, p. 257), the
death of the very subject she is composing: her “self.” James’s
insistence on the composer’s failure to secure the knowledge
or wholeness she seeks reveals the deep connection between
the danger of an idealizing aestheticism and Lacan’s argument
that such misrecognitions, however necessary, ultimately reveal
the permanent incompletion of the self.
Midway through the novel, Isabel reflects on the “wondrous
vision” she initially had of Gilbert Osmond: a vision “fed through
charmed senses and oh such a stirred fancy!” (p. 357). Lacan
asks, “How can the dream, the bearer of the subject’s desire
produce that which makes the trauma emerge?” (1981, p. 55).
This is the paradoxical question that Isabel explores in her
midnight vigil. James shows us his heroine “motionlessly seeing,” reviewing her journey and her decisions, from her initial
infatuation with Osmond to the world that now encloses her in
“a dark narrow alley with a dead wall at the end” (p. 356). When
James’s heroine reflects that Osmond has “deliberately, almost
malignantly . . . put the lights out one by one,” she understands
that he has withdrawn his appreciation of her ego ideal: “She
knew of no wrong he had done . . . she simply believed he
hated her” (p. 356). But Isabel also sees that Osmond’s hatred
is a result of her rejection of the way he wants to be seen: “It
was her scorn of his assumptions, it was this that made him
draw himself up . . . that she should turn the hot light of her
disdain upon his own conception of things—this was a danger
he had not allowed for” (p. 362). The “fatal attachment” which
linked Isabel to Osmond and Osmond to Isabel, constructed
around a mutual commitment to their respective self-images
(which each saw mirrored in the gaze of the other), has been
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undone: “they looked at each other with eyes that were on
either side a declaration of the deception suffered” (p. 356).
When it is clear that Osmond no longer mirrors back to her
the ideal Isabel has been fashioning, for herself but also to
please her suitor, her image of him also collapses. Isabel thus
discovers that her chosen object, that impossible object of desire,
is “the object which cannot be swallowed . . . It remains stuck
in the gullet of the signifier” (Žižek, 1999, p. 270). “Nothing
was a pleasure to her now . . . There was an everlasting weight
on her heart—there was a livid light on everything” (p. 363).
Like John Marcher’s “beast” in The Beast in the Jungle, perhaps
the most powerful representation of impossible desire in all of
James, Osmond’s rejection will force Isabel to experience the
“splitting” that engenders the paradoxical birth of her (shattered) subjectivity.
To many readers, Isabel’s painful struggle to understand
Osmond’s disaffection offers a poignant moment of recognition: James’s heroine seems to move from blindness to insight,
holding up to the light her original impressions of her husband
and comparing them to her new—and darker—knowledge. If
she has chosen her fate, according to such readings, she has
done so honorably, the way a tragic protagonist is blinded by
her own best qualities—her naïve, hopeful trust in another and
her overconfidence in her judgment. But Isabel takes unusual
responsibility for her role in defining Osmond, acknowledging
that her suitor “was not changed; he had not disguised himself” (p. 357). She concedes that she has been aware of “the
realms of restriction and depression” that constitute Osmond’s
nature from the beginning (p. 356). Given her early insights
about her suitor, and her consistent preference for the space
of melancholy, of darkness, one wonders about the perverse
pleasure this scene finally offers James’s heroine. In a sense,
it is the moment she has been waiting for. As her narrator
explains, “Suffering, with Isabel, was an active condition; it
was not a chill, a stupor, a despair; it was a passion of thought,
of speculation, of response to every pressure” (p. 356). The
“exquisite instrument” that is Osmond’s mind is well known to
her, and the “house of darkness, the house of dumbness, the
house of suffocation” is one that she has chosen (pp. 359–360).
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Just before Isabel’s painful examination of Osmond’s character during her reflective vigil, a scene that adumbrates her
own painful suppression of her identity as she has worked to
please her husband, James offers his readers a visual representation of Isabel, her official “portrait” as Osmond’s wife, one that
articulates the death-in-life quality that seems to permeate her
new identity. Ralph’s response to the portrait Osmond seems to
have succeeded in creating is a painful echo of his own initial
tendency to frame his cousin when she first arrives at Gardencourt: “Suddenly, I receive a Titian, by the post, to hang on my
wall . . .” (p. 63). Missing the ironic echo of his own impulses,
including his decision to endow his cousin with money so that
he can witness what she will make of her life, Ralph is horrified
at the way Isabel has become someone else’s representation:
she wears a mask that “completely cover[s] her face. There [is]
something fixed and mechanical in the serenity painted on it;
this [is] not an expression . . . it [is] a representation” (p. 330).
Ralph registers the way Isabel’s noble ideals have been both
realized and ironized: “Slender still, but lovelier than before,
she had gained no great maturity of aspect; yet there was an
amplitude and a brilliancy in her personal arrangements that
gave a touch of insolence to her beauty . . . The free, keen
girl had become quite another person; what he saw was the
fine lady who was supposed to represent something” (p. 331).
To Ralph, and to some critics, James’s heroine has simply
been “appropriated by Osmond’s mind,” but, in fact, this portrait is consonant with Isabel’s own aesthetic ideals (Kasten,
1984, p. 61). The “amplitude,” “brilliancy,” even, to a degree, the
“insolence” (p. 331) of Isabel’s character are already suggested
in her earliest fantasies about herself, her desire to be a controlled, aesthetically complete, representation. Long before the
appearance of Osmond she muses: “one should be one of the
best, should be conscious of a fine organisation” (pp. 53–54).
Isabel has become a portrait that not only Osmond but she
herself, and even Ralph, have helped to compose: she is “better
worth looking at than most works of art” (p. 50), as her cousin
describes her at the outset. But she is also “the fine lady who
. . . will always wear a mask” (p. 330). On one level, this portrait
is the logical culmination of Isabel’s quest, her induction into
Osmond’s world, her placement within the aesthetic frame she
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has chosen. Yet, as Jonathan Freedman has suggested, Isabel is
not wholly contained by the “insidious” “process of aestheticization” that grips Osmond; a “resonant ambiguity” remains that
grants her an “interpretative mystery” (1994, p. 68).
Ralph’s silent confrontation with Isabel’s mature selfportrait, and the “resonant ambiguity” of James’s heroine,
despite her seeming entrapment by Osmond, invites us to consider the complex meaning of portraiture in this novel. How
might James’s ideas about portraiture and, more broadly, his
extensive and varied use of art in his works, be connected to
our discussion of loss, emptiness and pleasurable pain, that is,
to Lacanian jouissance? To explore these questions, we need to
take a step back from The Portrait of a Lady and examine earlier
and later texts in which a work of art functions as an ambiguous object of desire, one that, with uncanny consistency, leads
the Jamesian protagonist through a range of emotions, from
self-blinding seduction to an embrace of the death drive, and
an acceptance of mortality, of the shattered subject.
III
In an essay entitled “Venice,” originally written in 1882
and later anthologized in Italian Hours, James is struck by a
painting of Tintoretto’s entitled “Pallas Chasing Away Mars”:
“a young woman of noble appearance is administering a gentle
push to a fine young man in armour, as if to tell him to keep
his distance.” He describes “the gentleness of this push . . . the
charming way in which she puts out her arm . . . and rests her
young hand, its rosy fingers parted, on his dark breastplate”
(James, 1988, p. 30). Pallas Athene’s stance echoes that of
Isabel Archer, whose deep intelligence and independence are
in conflict with her desire. In Tintoretto’s painting, as James
reads it, Athene’s gesture epitomizes desire in its moment of
suspended ambivalence: her push is “gentle”; her “rosy fingers”
touch Mars’s breast. Tintoretto’s Athene mirrors Isabel’s confused emotions towards her suitors.
James’s heroine’s affinity for sad places is similarly anticipated in his early travel literature. In 1873, in an essay entitled
“Roman Rides,” also later anthologized in Italian Hours, James
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writes of the Roman Campagna in a way that foreshadows Isabel’s sad visit there towards the end of her journey. He takes
deep delight in the “typical ‘Italian landscape’ of old-fashioned
art. It was so bright and yet so sad, so still and yet so charged
. . . with the murmur of an extinguished life” (1988, p. 106). A
few pages later, in the same essay, James “confess[es]” that the
pleasure he takes in the somber sadness of the scene “shows
a note of perversity” (p. 114). Frequently in his travel writing,
James relishes the discovery of landscapes that “dispose themselves into pictures” (p. 115), not merely for their beauty but
because they are filled with a history of what has been lost,
ruins that contain a dark core, a melancholy story.
Already in James’s early fiction, works of art, from sculptures to portraits, silently reveal the poignant truth of impossible desire, its connection to mortality. In several early tales,
where a work of art, literally or figuratively, plays a major role,
there is already a dangerous flirtation with death, even death
in life. In “The Madonna of the Future” and “The Last of the
Valerii,” an imagined painting and a literal sculpture lure the
main character into a state that anticipates madness, even death.
The work of art chosen by the character is negated: ridiculed,
or, literally, buried. The artist in “The Madonna of the Future”
chooses death over a life that has destroyed his illusion of the
Madonna (James, 1873/1962c). The young Italian nobleman
in “The Last of the Valerii” is eager to sacrifice his marriage,
and possibly his life, in his worship of the statue of Venus
(James, 1874/1962a). Although he relinquishes his desire at
the command of his wife who insists that the statue be buried,
he retains a hand of the sculpture, which remains (hidden) in
plain sight, in his private cabinet.
Euphemia de Mauves in “Madame de Mauves,” an 1874 tale
that probes the deferred desire that will shape the plot of The
Ambassadors, has a pure but frozen rigidity that is a source of
admiration for her innocent suitor Longmore, who, like Isabel
in her idealization of Osmond, sees in Euphemia’s coldness
“an extraordinary charm” (1874/1962b, p. 145). Her unattainability evokes in Longmore “a kind of aching impotence”
(p. 173) that anticipates Isabel’s pleasurable pain in her early
encounters with Osmond.
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From early stories to the novels of the major phase, we
see that James situates the art object, real or imagined, at the
crux of desire and loss, a loss that reflects Lacanian “lack,”
exposing not only his characters’ illusions but also their shattered subjectivity. Like Isabel, James’s late protagonists discover
that the aesthetic dimension brings with it tragic knowledge,
knowledge of their permanent incompletion, their mortality.
As they attempt to capture and still the lives around them, they
are trapped by their own designs, recognizing, finally, that the
aesthetic frame grants permanence only in death. Milly Theale,
in The Wings of the Dove, initially apprehends her mortality as
she gazes at the Bronzino Lord Mark takes her to see. She understands why the portrait reminds him of her: it is the face of
the young woman, “almost livid in hue” and “unaccompanied
by a joy.” Most important, she is “dead, dead, dead” (James,
1978, p. 137). Early in the novel, Milly has already discovered
“the great common anxiety,” the “grim breathing space” that
surrounds her like a gentle coffin (p. 153). But when Sir Luke
Strett, “the great doctor,” indicates that she will soon die, Milly
discovers that her new knowledge is “like an absolute possession,
a new resource altogether”; her destiny “something [already]
done up in the softest silk and tucked away under the arm of
memory” (p. 143). Milly acknowledges her death in life more
explicitly than Isabel, recognizing the power of her portrait
to grant permanence but only in the memory of those who
remain: “I shall never be better than this,” she tells Lord Mark,
as they gaze together at the Bronzino (p. 137). After her death,
Milly Theale becomes Densher’s “maimed child,” his “priceless
pearl” (p. 398), living forever within the frame of the portrait,
the beautiful Bronzino she encounters in Book I, as she takes
her place in Densher’s memory.
Perhaps James’s most complex example of the way portraits conceal, only to betray, the absence of life, the void at
the center of identity, is explored in The Golden Bowl. In the
opening chapters, Maggie Verver purposefully inducts Prince
Amerigo into her gallery, imagining the perfection he will bring
to her life and marriage as a morçeau de musée (James, 1985, p.
43), only to discover an imaginary “pagoda” in her garden that
denies her entrance. The pagoda represents the hidden desire
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of Charlotte and Amerigo, a Lacanian “stain” that defies Maggie’s ambitious efforts to control the design of her marriage.
It is only by consigning Charlotte and Amerigo to the status of
“a pair of effigies . . . on one of the platforms of Madame Tussaud” at the end of the novel that Maggie reclaims her status as
composer, but the work of art she has designed is devoid of life
(p. 574). Ironically, however, Amerigo, who seems to embody
the idea of the living dead, finally existing only within Maggie’s collection, signals in the subtlety of his gaze the Lacanian
Thing (Das Ding) that escapes his wife’s design—it is his gaze
that dominates the ending, hers that buries itself in his breast
“in pity and dread” (p. 580). At the end of both The Golden Bowl
and The Wings of the Dove, James’s protagonists are situated both
within and outside the frame they have composed, in the space
Lacan would call “between two deaths” (Lacan, 1986/1992, p.
270). Precisely because they are “outside or beyond all hope”
(p. 270), they can interrogate their own designs.
Isabel Archer, too, while seeming to remain within her portrait, in the end transcends the representation she has helped
to compose. We know, especially after her midnight vigil, that
her portrait contains a remainder, something that escapes the
frame. The question of that remainder haunts the final chapters
of the novel. A piece of the Lacanian Real—metonymy for the
original, albeit unknowable, Isabel before her induction into
Osmond’s symbolic world—continues to haunt the reader.15
IV
As James’s novel comes to a close, late portraits—of Osmond, of Isabel, of Merle—expose the profound emptiness at
the heart of everyone’s design, whether innocent or strategic,
and the powerful truth that this emptiness reveals: the failure of
representation, of the coherence of the subject. Following the
portrait of Isabel as observed by Ralph and the revised portrait
of Osmond reviewed by Isabel during her midnight vigil, James
offers us a final, explosive portrait of Serena Merle, one that
enables Isabel to confront her mentor’s betrayal and witness
the disintegration of the mask. Just after the Countess Gemini
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has told her of Merle’s duplicity and of her role in Isabel’s
marriage, she meets Merle unexpectedly at Pansy’s convent:
“Madame Merle was already so present to her vision that her
appearance in the flesh was like suddenly, and rather awfully,
seeing a painted picture move” (p. 456). In this moment, Isabel
recognizes Merle’s awareness that the truth of her relationship
to Osmond and Pansy is out: Isabel observes a “sudden break
in [Merle’s] voice, a lapse in her continuity, which was in itself
a complete drama . . . Isabel saw it all as distinctly as if it had
been reflected in a large clear glass . . . Madame Merle had
lost her pluck and saw before her the phantom of exposure”
(p. 458). We see, through Isabel’s eyes, the shattered “self” of
Serena Merle, a dark counterpoint to Isabel’s own failure to
create a coherent aesthetic self.
We have traced Isabel’s induction into the frame of the
picture, her consistent pattern of choosing negatively, her attraction to the “extraordinary charm” of late afternoon with its
“masses of purple shadow” (p. 226), her explicit preference for
dark spaces, for mystery, for “slightly treacherous” landscapes
(p. 265), for the “beautiful blank faces” of Greek sculptures and
their “noble quietude” (p. 257), her attraction to a life whose
“lowness of tone” (p. 237) anticipates the negation of her early
spirited impulses. In the final chapters of the novel Isabel enters
another frame, one where she immerses herself in her pain. Just
before her trip to England to see her dying cousin, Isabel takes
a drive into the Roman countryside and contemplates “the ruin
of her happiness” (p. 430). The landscape before her offers her
a “companionship in endurance,” a space where she can “drop
her secret sadness into the silence of lonely places” (p. 431).
What she sees perfectly mirrors James’s own discovery of the
melancholy Roman landscape in his early travel writing. She
gazes “through the veil of her personal sadness at the splendid
sadness of the scene,” feeling a kinship with the “motionless
shepherds in lonely attitudes” (p. 431). The landscape before
her is a fully realized, ironic reprise of Isabel’s early idealistic
projection of life with Osmond, an image suffused, we recall,
with the twilight “of an old sorrow that sometimes ached today”
(p. 237). Her nostalgic immersion in this moment is an act of
mourning for the loss of her idealized images—of those she
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has loved and of her own ideal self. Yet her feeling of “kinship”
with this scene and her recognition that the sadness is somehow
“splendid” testifies poignantly to the painful pleasure her new
condition has wrought. The selfhood Isabel now seeks is neither
the freedom of spirit she avows nor the self-destruction that
seems imminent at the novel’s close. Rather, she chooses the
“delightful sadness,” described by Denis de Rougemont, a life
in which “suffering and understanding are deeply connected;
death and self-awareness are in league” (1983, p. 51).
Following this sorrowful, contemplative moment in which
Isabel seems to accept her fate, she makes her way to London
to be with her dying cousin, Ralph. The journey, which she
undertakes (like Oedipus) “with sightless eyes” (p. 465), is a
subtle symbolic enactment of her own death: “to cease utterly,”
she muses, “to give it all up and not know anything more—this
idea was as sweet as the vision of a cool bath in a marble tank”
(p. 465). In her final meeting with her cousin on his deathbed,
Isabel strips herself of her mask and reveals her pain to him:
it is the only genuine, and explicit, moment of intimacy in
the novel. With Ralph dying in her arms, Isabel murmurs, “In
such hours as this, what have we to do with pain? That’s not
the deepest thing; there’s something deeper” (p. 478). This
“deeper” feeling is, in part, the love Isabel finally confesses to
her cousin, a very different kind of love from the painful pleasure we have been examining, something closer to karitas than
eros, yet she is already connecting the death of Ralph to her
own forthcoming imprisonment and dissolution. During her
journey to see him, she recalls the silent marble statues she had
identified with in the Roman gallery before her commitment
to Osmond. Anticipating her own entombment, she imagines
herself to be like one of “those Etruscan figures couched upon
the receptacle of their ashes” (p. 465). At the height of her
multiplied recognitions of betrayal and loss, Isabel confronts
the painful knowledge of her failed experiment as an artist, as
a composer of her own destiny.
Her touching final moment with Ralph before his death
is followed by a contrasting scene of forced intimacy with her
first suitor, Caspar Goodwood, who comes to Gardencourt to
offer her an escape from Osmond and the prison she is about
to re-enter. The scene between them is psychologically complex
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and fraught with contradiction. Isabel admits she is drawn to
him: “she had wanted help and here was help; it had come in
a rushing torrent.” But with her next thought, she recognizes
her deeper connection to the death drive: “to let him take
her into his arms would be the next best thing to her dying”
(p. 489). Goodwood, like Osmond, threatens to erase her
being, precisely through his overpowering love. Anticipating
his embrace, she recognizes “that she had never been loved
before” and “this belief, for a moment was a kind of rapture
in which she felt herself sink and sink” (pp. 488–489). Their
encounter is captured in a single sentence in the 1881 edition
of The Portrait: “His kiss was like a flash of lightning; when it
was dark again, she was free” (James, 1881/1997, p. 634). In
the 1908 edition, Isabel’s response is extraordinarily visceral,
emphasizing the physical and psychic pain Goodwood inflicts.
She experiences his embrace as a gothic nightmare. When he
seizes her, she feels “each thing in his hard manhood that had
least pleased her, each aggressive fact of his face, his figure, his
presence” (p. 489). His desire is “something potent, acrid and
strange”; it “force[s] open her set teeth” (p. 488). The violation
is not only sexual; it is ontological. Goodwood seems, literally,
to break open, dissolve, the boundaries of Isabel’s self: “The
world had never seemed so large; it seemed to open out, all
round her, to take the form of a mighty sea, where she floated
in fathomless waters” (p. 489).
What are we to make of James’s heroine’s refusal of
Goodwood and the contradictory emotions that she feels?
Her rejection of him cannot be reduced, as he suggests, to
a conflict between her desire and what “people will say, for
the bottomless idiocy of the world” (p. 488). Isabel’s blunt
American suitor’s arguments are somehow beside the point;
she barely hears them. The truth is, he does not represent,
has never represented, Isabel’s desire, and his embrace is a
willful and one-sided “act of possession” she cannot bear. His
final attempt to seize Isabel has the opposite effect: “She had
not known where to turn; but she knew now. There was a
very straight path” (p. 490). Goodwood does not offer a freer
choice, but rather a more literal kind of possession, absent, to
be sure, Osmond’s passive aggressive manipulation. But why
does Isabel, in the end, choose the negation that is Osmond?16
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Michael Gorra, in his profoundly thoughtful Portrait of a
Novel, offers a context for Isabel’s decision, arguing that her
choice both echoes and anticipates an insight characteristic
of the American novel from Hawthorne to Fitzgerald—that of
innocence lost and accepted, the recognition “that America
itself has had no separate or special creation . . . no exemption
from history itself” (2012, p. 278). Thus when Goodwood tells
Isabel, “‘the world’s all before us—and the world’s very big’”
(p. 489), his words, according to Gorra, “are themselves an echo
. . . [They] summon up the ending of Paradise Lost, when after
tasting the apple and being thrust from the garden, Adam and
Eve must step forth into the fallen world before them. This
is the world in which Isabel knows she must live: a world of
constraint and necessity, in which her possibilities are limited
by her past” (Gorra, 2012, p. 326). If we grant Gorra’s claim
that Isabel’s decision suggests a recognition of “constraint” and
“necessity,” we should also observe that such a recognition is
characteristic of the tragic heroine’s fatal encounter with her
destiny, pointing, once again, to the Lacanian path we have
been tracing here, the path of jouissance. In fact, Lacan’s own
analysis of Antigone’s character perfectly describes the trajectory of Isabel Archer: “She pushes to the limit the realization of
something that might be called the pure and simple desire of
death as such. She incarnates that desire” (1986/1992, p. 282).
But something equally important and specific to Isabel’s
character occurs in the climactic confrontation with Goodwood. She cannot accept his offer of an escape because such
a resolution is completely inconsistent with everything she has
struggled to understand and to become—it does not match
her self-portrait. True, like her successors, Milly Theale in The
Wings of the Dove and Maggie Verver in The Golden Bowl, Isabel
is forced to acknowledge the failure of her project, her attempt
to shape a perfect portrait of a partner, a relationship, and an
aesthetically satisfying, though conventional, humanist self. Her
position at the end of the novel is more consistent with her
fellow prisoners than is usually granted. Anticipating Maggie’s
hollow triumph when she encloses Amerigo in her portrait of
her marriage and sends Charlotte into exile, only to find herself
imprisoned in the rigid aesthetic structure she has designed,
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Isabel’s stance also foreshadows Milly Theale’s transcendent
but equally hollow triumph in death as the memory of her
love imprints itself on Densher’s consciousness through her
unread letter. But also like Maggie and Millie, Isabel actively
confronts her fears—of life, of suffering, of death in life. Her
final choices reveal her acceptance of jouissance, of mortality.
As she frees herself from Goodwood’s embrace, she once
again anticipates her own death, thinking of “those wrecked
and under water following a train of images before they sink”
(p. 489). When she finds herself immersed in the “mighty sea”
that now surrounds her (p. 489), Isabel experiences what Ellie
Ragland, following Lacan, calls “the hole constituted in the
compact space we call being” (1996, p. 193). Glimpsing the
anamorphic blot that undermines all desire, she chooses her
“very straight path” back to Rome, and to Osmond (p. 490).
Yet if the heroine of The Portrait seems more wholly alone
than her successors, without a hint of residual or redemptive
love on the part of Osmond (in contrast to the more complex
emotional renderings of Densher and Amerigo), James does
not leave us with a sense of a diminished, resigned, or despairing Isabel. In rejecting Goodwood and returning to Osmond,
we may say that Isabel “persists in unsatisfaction” and, in doing
so, she preserves an “authentic,” “empty” “place of enjoyment”
(Zupančič, 2000, p. 240)—the space of jouissance.17 It may seem
not only perverse but cruel to impose such a reading on a
character whose apparent failure of insight seems meant to
invoke more “tender” and “expectant” emotions that James’s
narrator suggests we adopt early in the novel (p. 54), for as de
Rougemont wryly asks, “Who would dare to admit that . . . what
[one] longs for with all one’s being is the annihilation of . . .
being?” (1983, p. 49). Nonetheless, Isabel returns to Osmond,
as Sigi Jottkand suggests, for “her own destiny in death, her
essential negativity” (2005, p. 28). Why? Because her encounter with the limit of desire is the necessary step for “access” to
“realization” of herself—that is, realization of her permanent
in-coherence (Lacan, 1986/1992, p. 300). In other words, this
is precisely the moment that the subject comes into being, in
this encounter with its fragmentation: “Life can only be approached, can only be lived or thought about, from the place
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of that limit where [it] is already lost, where [one] is already
on the other side” (Lacan, 1986/1992, p. 280).
Throughout James’s major novels and tales, objects of
“art,” idealized progeny of his characters, are undermined at
the height of their powers; in their place is a gap, an opening,
an abyss that is the real subject of his fiction. In the depths
of that abyss, we see the structure of desire, its relation to
the quest for an ideal, complete, autonomous self. In James,
this ideal is consistently betrayed, exposing the truth of each
protagonist’s shattered and permanently incomplete self.
Despite The Portrait’s painful conclusion, suggesting Isabel’s
literal imprisonment, James’s heroine is, paradoxically, liberated. When Isabel flees Goodwood she is neither diminished
nor resigned, and the ending of the novel, far from being its
least satisfactory aspect, is from a post-humanist perspective
its most satisfying. Her decision to return to Osmond illuminates her Sophoclean “splendour,”18 her radical refusal of the
conventional humanist position longed for by some of James’s
contemporary readers, which would return her to a world where
Goodwood or Warburton would truly grind her “in the very
mill of the conventional” (p. 478), demanding that she live the
illusion of a coherent self, in a safe but empty shell. Returning to Osmond, Isabel defines herself against the wholeness
and autonomy she has consciously sought—in a space where
she will experience her in-coherence. As Žižek explains, “Far
from standing for the simple opposite of life—that is, for a
tendency towards self-obliteration—the fundamental paradox
of the psychoanalytic notion of the death drive [of jouissance]
is that it is the Freudian name for immortality” (1999, p. 261).
Like Antigone, even though she is entombed and believed
dead, Isabel lives splendidly in pleasurable pain, a shattered,
yet (self) valorized, subject.
Notes
1.
2.

All references to the text are from the Norton Critical Edition (2nd ed.), unless
otherwise noted. The Norton Critical Edition is based on the 1908 New York
Edition.
Miller explores a variety of possibilities for Isabel’s decision but concludes that “the
novel does not tell the reader enough to confirm a reading. It leaves the reader
unable to understand Isabel’s decisions and therefore unable, if the reader does
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not import something from outside the text, to pass judgment on her decision
as good or bad” (2005, p. 743).
Despite James’s partial concession to his contemporary critics, it is worth noting
that in his substantial revision of the original 1881 edition in 1908, he deliberately
removed any ambiguity about Isabel’s decision to return to Osmond, and, in this
sense, he has not left his heroine en l’air. See Bazzanella (1969) for a thorough
discussion of James’s revision of the novel’s ending.
“Who is there who in the name of pleasure doesn’t start to weaken when the first
half-serious step is taken toward jouissance?” (Lacan, 1992, p. 185). Referencing
Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Lacan observes, “This is where the function
of the lost object originates in Freudian discourse . . . it is explicitly around
masochism . . . conceived only in the dimension of the search for this ruinous
jouissance, that Freud’s entire text revolves” (Lacan, 2007, p. 46).
According to Ellie Ragland, the quest for the object of desire always involves, on
some tacit level, an awareness of the impossibility of an original coherence (and
connection to the mother): “The loss of this imagined continuity . . . places loss
squarely at the center of all language and all human relations” (1996, p. 195).
“Freud . . . wrote Das Ich und das Es in order to maintain this fundamental distinction between the true subject of the unconscious and the ego” (Lacan, 1977,
p. 128). Dylan Evans clarifies: “The subject can never be anything other than
divided, split, alienated from himself” (1996, p. 192); for Freud and for Lacan,
this “split” identifies the distinction between the conscious and unconscious: “the
split denotes the impossibility of the ideal of a fully present self-consciousness;
the subject will never know himself completely” (Evans, 1996, p. 192).
For Lacan, it is “lack” which causes desire to arise. The first object of lack is one’s
own loss, “the phantasy of one’s death, of one’s disappearance” (Lacan, 1981,
p. 214). But lack continues to create “the link between the desire of the subject
and the desire of the Other” (p. 215).
Interestingly, William James, anticipating Lacan’s formulation, provides a straightforward account of this notion of love as defined by the other: “The most peculiar
social self which one is apt to have is in the mind of the person one is in love
with . . . To his own consciousness he is not, so long as this particular social self
fails to get recognition, and when it is recognized his contentment passes all
bounds” (James, 1890, p. 294).
The objet petit a is “the cause of desire” and the “object around which the drive
turns” (Lacan, 1981, p. 243); it is “at the level of the desire of the Other that
the subject’s desire is constituted” (p. 235). Referencing Freud’s chapter on
“Hypnosis and the State of Being in Love,” Lacan also connects the a to the ego
ideal: Freud “designates what he calls the object—in which you must recognize
what I call the a—the ego and the ego ideal” (p. 272).
In developing the notion of jouissance, Lacan is drawing on Freud’s classic formulation regarding the structure of love: “Some obstacle is necessary to swell the tide
of the libido to its heights; and in all periods of history, wherever natural barriers
in the way of satisfaction have not sufficed, mankind has erected conventional
ones in order to be able to enjoy love” (1912, p. 187).
Veeder notes that Isabel’s “lifelong dilemma” (perhaps like that of James himself) is “how to love, and yet maintain enough distance to escape the exposure
inevitable with intimacy; how to remain in life, but not of it” (1990, p. 118).
“Lacan defines the objet petit a as ‘a symbol of the lack’ (Lacan, 1981, p. 103). He
associates the objet petit a with the term agalma (a Greek term meaning a glory, an
ornament, an offering to the gods, or a little statue of a god) which he extracts
from Plato’s Symposium. Just as the agalma is a precious object hidden inside a
relatively worthless box, so the objet petit a is the object of desire which we seek
in the other” (Evans, 1996, p. 125).
As Lacan explains, “This entropy, this point of loss, is the sole point, the sole
regular point at which we have access to the nature of jouissance” (2007, pp. 5051).
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14. “The Thing,” or Das Ding, for Lacan, is, in relation to jouissance, the lost object
which we constantly seek, “the object of incestuous desire, the mother” (Evans,
1996, p. 205). The subject circles around it without ever attaining it, yet it remains
the cause of desire. From 1963 on, Lacan replaces this term with objet petit a as
the symbol of our unattainable desire (p. 205).
15. The “real,” for Lacan, is that which is outside language, that which “resists symbolization absolutely” (1988, p. 66). It is fundamentally related to the pleasure
principle (and stands in opposition to the reality principle) because it makes us
aware of its existence through trauma, through its inaccessibility: “it is essentially
the missed encounter” (Lacan, 1981, p. 55).
16. Osmond tells Isabel, “I think we should accept the consequences of our actions,
and what I value most in life is the honour of a thing!” (p. 446). As the primary
condition of an ethical stance, Lacan asks the question, “Have you acted in
conformity with the desire that is in you?” (1986/1992, p. 314). Osmond’s final
insistence on Isabel’s fidelity to her act (of marrying him) supports a Lacanian
reading of his function: he has pushed Isabel to a consistency which is logical and
even (perversely) ethical: he demands that she be true to her choice—regardless
of its content. However painful it may seem, Isabel remains true to her original
desire.
17. James’s heroine’s “fidelity” to this “lost enjoyment,” to apply Alenka Zupančič’s
reading of Lacan, reveals a “‘heroism of the lack’. . .an attitude through which
the individual “persists” in “unsatisfaction” and “desire preserves the authentic
place of enjoyment, even if it remains empty” (2000, p. 240).
18. See Lacan’s analysis of Antigone, as an illustration of the death instinct: “Antigone
reveals to us the line of sight that defines desire. . . . It is Antigone herself who
fascinates us, Antigone in her unbearable splendor . . . This terrible, self-willed
victim disturbs us” (1986/1992, p. 281). “She pushes to the limit the realization
of something that might be called the pure and simple desire of death as such.
She incarnates that desire” (p. 282).
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